🔗 Share this article

During the first week of December, President Trump brought together the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a truce. The commitment involved an end to years of warfare in the unstable eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Weeks later, however, a sharply contrasting approach to conflict emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, targeting sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President warned, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Strategic Pivot

These divergent actions encapsulates the central feature of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a stepping back from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on trade and stopping hostilities—even as this squares with the nascent aerial operations in Nigeria is an open question.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a high-ranking U.S. state department official during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential representative reinforced this, saying the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Mixed Signals

This shift is consequential, but observers caution it is early to gauge its impact. The approach is influenced by the President’s direct manner, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a scholar for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research forecasts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Diplomatic Neglect and Strains

Unlike his predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable disagreement has developed with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Engagement and Selective Intervention

An analogous standoff flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the harsh rhetoric may have spurred the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Other Powers

Experts characterize the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the new approach likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” she added.